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This article focuses on the nature and position of corporate insiders. The
discussion leads to a suggestion that one punishment of insiders who mis-
appropriated what is not theirs—the information—is to disqualify them for
a position of corporate power.
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I. INTRODUCTION
FIFTY years ago, the Supreme Court interpreted Rule 10b-5 underthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 imposing criminal sanctionson insider traders. In that case, the trading was triggered by infor-
mation, discovered by some employees of Texas Gulf Sulphur Corpora-
tion,2 that had the potential of greatly raising the value of the
corporation’s shares. The employees bought options on the corporation’s
shares in the hopes of benefiting from the high probability of an ex-
traordinary rise in the value of the shares.3
With time, the number of court cases involving insider trading has
risen. Arguments about the range and detail of the prohibition have con-
tinued. Millions of dollars in fines and even prison sentences in a few
cases have not seemed to deter these violations. The purpose of this Arti-
cle is to analyze the source of insider trading fraud and propose an addi-
tional type of punishment, which might be more persuasive to potential
violators and more effective in preventing insider trading.
Part I of the Article discusses the definition of the term “insider trad-
ing.” Part II describes the kind of information that constitutes “inside
information.” Part III offers the reasons for prohibiting the use of inside
information before the information becomes public. Lastly, Part IV pro-
poses to add a type of punishment to deter insider traders and those who
pay for insider information.
II. WHAT DOES TRADING BY INSIDERS MEAN?
This question is not unreasonable. After all, securities investors have
different expertise, different free time to follow the markets, different
ability to judge market trends and information, and different risk toler-
ance. Let each investor and trader gather information about which invest-
ments to buy and sell and “let the best information-gatherer win!”
Besides, there are many experts in the securities trading area who, like
doctors, lawyers, and experts in finance, offer advice to investors. These
experts could counteract those who have insider information.
Yet, the reaction of the securities experts is puzzling. It seems that
quite a few experts in this area would gladly pay for insider information.
The reason why these experts are ready and eager to purchase insider
information lies in the nature of this type of information. This informa-
tion is not expert information. Anyone, or almost everyone, with sufficient
basic knowledge of the securities markets could understand it, evaluate it,
and decide whether to act upon it. Insider information is information that
is (i) not usually hard for investors to understand; (ii) not publicly availa-
ble; and most importantly (iii) timely information for investments. Traders
1. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2017).
2. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 856 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc).
3. See id. at 841–42, 844.
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on inside information do not need special wisdom or special risk toler-
ance. The prohibition on insider trading is linked to (i) fraud by trusted
persons and (ii) its impact on the securities markets.
Trusted persons (i.e., fiduciaries) may not misappropriate or offer to
others information that does not belong to them. How does fraud on the
corporations relate to the securities markets rules? In this case the use of
insider information involves two combined wrongs. One is the use of mis-
appropriated—stolen—information. It is information that does not be-
long to the trading insiders. This information is not false. In fact, it is
usually quite reliable. But it is entrusted to insiders as fiduciaries. Fiducia-
ries may not use it for their own benefit, as the information does not
belong to them.
The other part of the wrong is its adverse impact and fraud on the
investing public. To be sure, investors in the securities markets do not
have equal information about traded securities. They may, and can, draw
information from various sources, paid and unpaid, direct and overheard.
However, insiders commit fraud not only on the source of the entrusted
information, but also on the other outside investors and the market
system.
Yet, investors are not required to draw on the same sources of informa-
tion. So, why is drawing on this particular source of insiders deemed
fraud on the securities system? One answer is that no investor may use
information received fraudulently. The use of the stolen information per-
petrates fraud on a societal level—on the investors in these securities as
well as on the securities markets.
Thus, fraud on the issuing corporation constitutes fraud on the inves-
tors as well as on the securities markets as institutions, which fraud cor-
rupts. This is why even if the source of the insider information agreed to
its use by the insiders, the insiders’ trades are fraudulent. Whenever the
information that affects corporate securities market prices is not publi-
cized and insiders make use of it, the outside investors are defrauded, and
the financial system becomes tainted with suspicion and mistrust. Insider
trading links fraud of the corporation’s shareholders with fraud of the
securities markets.
The law does not require equality of knowledge or wisdom, or low or
high risk tolerance of the investing securities traders. But, it does require
securities issuers to disclose information in order to maintain a measure
of investors’ trust in the securities market. No one may spread false infor-
mation to mislead investors.4 Laws that require securities issuers to dis-
close information require the information to be true.5 The concept of
4. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
5. See id.; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (holding that a
duty to disclose material information arises when a party has information another party is
entitled to know because of a fiduciary relation between them); Dirks v. Sec. Exch.
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 646, 655–61 (1983) (extending liability to tippee where insider has
breached its fiduciary duty by disclosing to tippee and tippee knows or should know of
breach); United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–63 (1997) (recognizing liability
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fraud includes not only distribution of misinformation but also unfair
preference related to the source of information, regardless of whether the
information is false or not.
Therefore, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) rule deal-
ing with insider trading grounds its prohibition in fiduciary duties of
“trust and confidence” of insiders to their corporations or to other
sources of their information. Rule 10b-5 imposes a “duty of trust or confi-
dence” under a list of circumstances: “[w]henever a person agrees to
maintain information in confidence,” whenever a person communicates
material nonpublic information and knows or should know that the per-
son that communicated the nonpublic information expects it to be confi-
dential, or when the information is received from a “spouse, parent, child,
or sibling.”6
III. WHAT KIND OF INFORMATION CONSTITUTES INSIDE
INFORMATION?
Usually, inside information has a number of features:
(i) The information is very likely to significantly affect the market
prices of particular securities, either bringing the securities’ prices up or
down, in a very short time. For example, in the Texas Gulf Sulphur case,
the information involved a discovery by a mining corporation of a very
rich ore in land, which was not yet fully acquired by the corporation, but
the corporation had legal rights to acquire.7 The corporation was ex-
pected to fairly quickly negotiate with the land owner and announce its
finding, leading to a substantial rise in the price of its securities. In fact,
the insiders bought options to buy the corporation’s securities, rather
than the corporation’s securities themselves, thus reducing the possible
rise in the securities prices before the announcement of the information.
In addition, options were less expensive than the price of the securities
and thereby had a greater potential of increasing the insiders’ profits. As
expected, the corporation did not announce the discovery and waited un-
til the land was acquired.
(ii) Very few people know this information. In Texas Gulf Sulphur, the
corporation covered the excavations, which revealed the rich finding. This
coverage reduced the potential spread of the information to noninsiders.
Other investors would have found it near impossible or very costly to
discover this information. Therefore, they were not likely to buy the cor-
poration’s securities, and thus would not raise the demand and the price
of the securities.
(iii) The situation provides an opportunity for insiders to gain high re-
turns by quick and fairly low-risk investments once the information is
where insider trades in shares of his corporation on basis of material nonpublic informa-
tion or where a person misappropriates confidential information for securities trading pur-
poses in breach of a duty owed to the source of information).
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(b)(1)–(3).
7. See Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 843–57.
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made public, and investors will then rush to buy the corporation’s
securities.
(iv) The prohibition on the use of inside information covers not only
the insiders but also any person in possession of inside information that
tips others about it, as well as a knowing “tippee” who trades on the basis
of the information. Furthermore, the tipper—the insider—need not bene-
fit financially from his or her tipping.8 That is, perhaps, because tipping
inside information to others can provide psychological and other satisfac-
tory present or future rewards. The harm to the system and to other in-
vestors need not be linked to the insider’s financial rewards so long as it
rewards the tippees.
Insider trading is pernicious and appears in other contexts prohibited
by law. Thus, a special kind of insider trading—market timing—has
arisen in the context of investment companies. In this case, investors in
shares of a mutual fund pay the fund’s managers for information about
content of the fund’s portfolio securities. This information was made pub-
lic only at 4:00 p.m. of each day on which the New York Stock Exchange
was open.9 Only those who paid for the information could redeem their
shares or buy fund shares at a profitable price. Moreover, continuous re-
demptions and purchases by these informed investors harmed unin-
formed investors because the increased trading in the funds’ shares
required fund managers to keep more cash and raised trading costs as
well.10
Another form of insider trading involves members of Congress dealing
in policy decisions that affect publicly traded companies. The Stop Trad-
ing on Congressional Knowledge (STOCK) Act directs the congressional
ethics committees to issue guidance clarifying that a member or employee
of Congress may not use nonpublic information derived from their posi-
tion or “gained from the performance of [their] official responsibilities as
a means for making a private profit.”11 In addition, the Act makes it clear
that “[m]embers of Congress and employees of Congress are not exempt
from the insider trading prohibitions arising under the securities laws.”12
Further, the Act requires members of Congress and congressional staff to
report certain financial transactions,13 and also requires that financial dis-
closure forms of members and employees of Congress be made available
8. See generally Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
9. Amendments to Rules Governing Pricing of Mutual Fund Shares, 68 Fed. Reg.
70,388 (proposed Dec. 17, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 270).
10. Mandatory Redemption Fees for Redeemable Fund Securities, 69 Fed. Reg. 11,762
(proposed Mar. 11, 2004) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 270).
11. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act of 2012 (STOCK Act), Pub. L. No.
112-105, § 3, 126 Stat. 291, 292 (2012).
12. Id. § 4(a); see id. § 4(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(g) (2012)) (providing that
“each [m]ember . . . or employee of Congress owes a duty arising from a relationship of
trust and confidence . . . with respect to material, nonpublic information derived from such
person’s position . . . or gained from the performance of such person’s official
responsibilities”).
13. See id. § 6 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 103(l) (West 2012)).
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to the public.14 But, Congress subsequently eliminated the online disclo-
sure requirement for these financial transaction reports.15
A somewhat similar issue arises in an entirely different context, but
with a similar result relating to trade secret issues.16 “The relationship
between an employer and an employee is a confidential one.”17 When the
employee’s knowledge and skills are “tied up” with trade secrets18 and
their employee is “intimately familiar” with the trade secret from the em-
ployment, there is a “substantial likelihood” that the knowledge will be
used in the subsequent employment.19 Where “there is a high degree of
probability that the subsequent competitive employment will lead to
the[ ] wrongful use or disclosure” of trade secrets, an employer may be
able to enjoin such employment even if there was no covenant not to
compete.20
IV. WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR PROHIBITING THE USE
OF INSIDE INFORMATION?
A. WHAT ARE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN EXPERTS AND INSIDERS?
Not all investors are experts. If the uninformed investors suspect, or
are convinced, that the informed expert investors will do better in their
trading, they may either refrain from trading or may seek experts to guide
them. Therefore, experts can benefit from their expertise either by trad-
ing on their own account or by offering their expertise to nonexperts and
charging for their services.
The expertise required in determining securities investments is first
composed of general knowledge of the securities markets and informa-
tion about particular issuers. The second aspect of expertise can be de-
rived from insider trading. Both expert trading and insider trading have
this feature in common. The judgment of both is affected by information
about a particular issuer, and in both cases the information might impact
the issuer’s securities prices within a relatively short period of time.
14. See id. § 8 (codified at 5 U.S.C.A. app. 4 § 105 (West 2012)).
15. See Modifications of Online Access to Certain Financial Disclosure Statements
and Related Forms, Pub. L. No. 113-7, § 1(b)(1)(C), 127 Stat. 438, 439 (2013); see also
Samuel Taube, Why Congressional Insider Trading Is Legal—and Profitable, INVESTMENT
U (July 22, 2017), http://www.investmentu.com/article/detail/55695/why-congressional-in
sider-trading-legal-profitable#.WXZmojFciQs [https://perma.cc/42KA-8RAL] (criticizing
elimination of requirement).
16. 1 ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 5.01, at
5-3 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2017) (1967).
17. Id. at § 5.02[1], at 5-6 (updated Apr. 2015).
18. See id. at § 5.02[3][d], at 5-43 (updated Sept. 2011).
19. See id. at 5-43 to -50.
20. See id. at § 5.02[3][d], at 5-55 to -56 (updated Dec. 2013) (internal citations
omitted).
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B. WHY IS TRADING ON EXPERT INFORMATION PERMISSIBLE WHILE
TRADING ON INSIDE INFORMATION CONSTITUTES A
CRIMINAL OFFENSE?
One answer to this question of why trading on expert information is
permissible, while trading on inside information constitutes a criminal of-
fense, is that anyone can buy the service of experts. This is because it is
available, while, by definition, timely and important inside information is
not publicly available, nor is it available to experts. Society benefits and is
enriched by experts and their service to nonexperts. Therefore, the use of
experts does not constitute a violation of the law; on the contrary, it is
encouraged by law.
In addition, usually, experts are fiduciaries. They are legally prohibited
from using their knowledge at the expense of those who rely on them.
After all, when the truth is uncovered, not only those who suffered from
breach of trust but others as well will shun the experts. Thus, if it is diffi-
cult to distinguish the true and honest experts from the fraudulent ones,
investors will avoid all experts to the detriment of society at large.
C. INSIDERS MAY OR MAY NOT BE EXPERTS, BUT ARE THE
HOLDERS OF UNIQUE INFORMATION
Insiders are trusted not to use their inside information, which others
cannot legally gain or use. Therefore, it is not the use of any information,
but rather the use of nonpublic information that constitutes information
use as a violation of the law. This nonpublic information can be stolen,
bought, and even created. In all these situations, the use of this informa-
tion could undermine the public’s trust in the markets, and thus harm
both individuals and the system as whole.
D. THE MAIN ASSUMPTION UNDERLYING RULE 10B-5 AND THE
TEXAS GULF SULPHUR CASE IS THAT INVESTORS’ TRUST IS
A BASIC CONDITION TO ASSURING SUCCESSFUL
SECURITIES MARKETS
Investors’ trust is a foundation of the securities system. We learned that
when trust is undermined, the securities markets will dry up, as they did
in 1929, and to some extent in 2008. Being sensitive to the impact of mar-
ket “runs,” we have established a highly detailed regulatory system to
avoid them. In great part, the regulation is based on disclosure of the
truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. Law imposes on issuers
a duty to publicly offer relevant detailed information about the corpora-
tion’s affairs, as well as trustworthiness (fiduciary duties) on in-
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termediaries,21 advisers,22 and managers of pooled securities investments
(mutual funds).23
Thus, the crucial part of Rule 10b-5 consists of regulating the source of
nonpublic information, that is, the insiders—those who by virtue of their
position acquire information or create information that outside investors
do not have. And, as noted, the information (and use of the information),
which the insiders possess, is not theirs. They hold the information as
fiduciaries; if they use it for any other purpose besides that for which they
hold it, they are deemed to have stolen the information.
It should be noted that if the same information is used by outsiders
who happened to overhear it or gain it without collaboration with insid-
ers, the use of this same information by these outsiders is not prohib-
ited.24 That is because the wrong is not merely in possessing inside
information, but in its use by (i) insiders or (ii) others who knowingly
accept from insiders the information and use it.
E. THROUGHOUT THE YEARS, THE NUMBER OF CASES AGAINST
INSIDERS WHO TRADED ON INSIDE INFORMATION HAS
RISEN AND THE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES HAS
BECOME VERY DETAILED25
In addition, executives who wish to buy or sell stock in their own com-
pany must file Form 4 with the Securities and Exchange Commission.26
Yet, ways to circumvent the prohibition on insider trading have increased
with cunningness and complexity. Insider trading has been linked to nu-
merous items contained in other items, with little information about their
source. Further, the use of technology and the construction of items
within items has drowned insider trades, thus making the string of insid-
ers harder to identify. If a link or part of the items subject to the violation
21. See e.g., In re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178–80 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding a
fiduciary relationship between investment banker and client based on facts and circum-
stances); Leib v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 461 F. Supp. 951, 953–54
(E.D. Mich. 1978), aff’d, 647 F.2d 165 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding that broker has fiduciary
duty to customer with nondiscretionary account or where “broker has usurped actual con-
trol over a technically non-discretionary account”).
22. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012); Sec. Exch. Comm’n v. Cap. Gains Res. Bureau, Inc.,
375 U.S. 180, 190–92 (1963).
23. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012) (fiduciary duty of investment advisers); see also 15
U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2012) (imposing fiduciary duty on adviser of an investment company
with respect to compensation paid by company to adviser).
24. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
25. See Mirela v. Hristova, The Case for Insider-Trading Criminalization and
Sentencing Reform, 13 TRANSACTIONS 267, 280 (2012) (noting that from 2007–2011 the
number of insider trading cases handled by the Eastern and Southern Districts of New
York increased from that of prior periods); MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, INSIDER
TRADING: 2009 REVIEW (2010), http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/insider-trading-2009-
review-29812/ [https://perma.cc/5AVH-FKPZ] (analyzing recent enforcement actions).
26. U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM 4, STATEMENT OF CHANGES OF BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP OF SECURITIES, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form4data.pdf [https://perma
.cc/L494-FJ6M].
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is missing then, arguably, no violation was committed, regardless of the
results.
An example of outsiders trading with the help of insiders in mutual
funds is the Putnam case, which reflects the Texas Gulf Sulphur princi-
ples. In that case, insiders—the managers of mutual funds—knew the de-
tails of the funds’ trades.27 The trades were large, and they had an impact
on market prices. This was the inside information, as the outside share-
holders did not have it, and could not have acquired it unless they were
told by the insiders. The fund managers and other insiders had no diffi-
culty in buying or selling the securities to be traded by the funds and
thereby gain or avoid losses from the funds’ large trades that affected
market prices. But, conversely, outside shareholders did not have this in-
formation and could not gain or avoid losses.
Interestingly, the assets managed by Putnam were significantly reduced
not so much by the court’s decision or its application but by the investors,
who happened to be very large institutions. After they withdrew their
investments, Putnam remained alive, but nearly empty. Although it never
regained its prior size, it has survived and may be growing.28
Insiders are trusted not to use inside information that others cannot
legally acquire or learn about. Therefore, it is not the use of any informa-
tion, but the use of any information that is nonpublic information that
makes the use a violation of the law. Such inside information could be
stolen, bought, or created.
The Putnam case and the Texas Gulf Sulphur case reflect the same
violation. In the Putnam case there were insiders—managers of funds—
who knew when and how much they would trade in fund assets. In Texas
Gulf Sulphur, the employees knew about the discovery and its
implication.
V. A SUGGESTED APPROACH TO DETER INSIDER
TRADING
Currently, the mechanisms for deterring insider trading consist of
money fines, sometimes very large, and, increasingly, prison sentences.29
27. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Putnam Agrees to Pay $55 Million
to Resolve SEC Enforcement Action Related to Market Timing by Portfolio Managers
(Apr. 8, 2004), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-49.htm; Putnam Inv. Mgmt., LLC, In-
vestment Advisers Act Release No. 2226, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,412
(Apr. 8, 2004).
28. See, e.g., Lavonne Kuykendall, Putnam May Get Impressive Price, Despite Trou-
bles, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 27, 2006), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB116458863982033127
(noting that “assets under management . . . dropped steadily” after scandals).
29. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains Record $92.8
Million Penalty Against Raj Rajaratnam (Nov. 8, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release,
Rajaratnam Penalty], https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-233.htm [https://perma.cc/
DZ82-AE3C] (noting that SEC obtained “largest penalty ever assessed against an individ-
ual in an SEC insider trading case”); Hristova, supra note 25, at 280–81 (noting that from
2007–2011 the percentage of insider trading cases handled by the Eastern and Southern
Districts of New York resulting in prison terms and the average prison sentence increased
from those of prior periods).
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For example, the SEC “obtained a $13.9 million penalty against former
Goldman Sachs board member Rajat K. Gupta for illegally tipping corpo-
rate secrets to former hedge fund manager Raj Rajaratnam.”30 Gupta
was also “permanently barred from serving as an officer or director of a
public company.” Gupta allegedly “disclosed confidential information to
Rajaratnam about Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s $5 billion investment in
Goldman Sachs, as well as nonpublic details about Goldman Sachs’s fi-
nancial results.”31 In addition, the SEC obtained a $92.8 million penalty
judgment against Rajaratnam, which was “the largest penalty ever as-
sessed against an individual in an SEC insider trading case.”32
If we shift our focus from the impact of insider trading on the market
to the insider traders themselves, we generally find that they are not the
hungry kind. In fact, many are wealthy individuals in high corporate and
financial entity positions. They hire excellent lawyers, fight with the regu-
lators, and settle the cases against them by paying large sums of money.33
Yet, they do not lose face. It seems that they continue to have the support
of their colleagues and, in general, maintain the backing of colleagues.
Needless to say, there is a continued search for loopholes in the law and
for ways to get around the regulation and the regulators.
For example, Rule 10b5-1 allows insiders to trade when the trades coin-
cide unintentionally with inside information. That was assured by creating
a “fixed formula” for trading. Therefore, if a trade coincided with inside
information, it would not be in violation of the law if the trade followed
the formula—blindly and automatically.34 However, one such insider be-
gan to change and adjust the formula of the fixed trades, presumably ac-
cording to his inside information, whether specific or general. Thus, the
mechanism no longer assured that the trades were not affected by insider
information. But, this insider was charged with violating the rule.35 In
sum, this case demonstrates that one can trade on inside information
even though one seems not to be doing so.
The number of cases against inside traders demonstrates that insiders
who trade on inside information have found sufficient justifications for
continuing to do so. On September 8, 2017, Bloomberg noted that three
30. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Obtains $13.9 Million Penalty




32. Press Release, Rajaratnam Penalty, supra note 29.
33. See, e.g., Zachary A. Goldfarb, SEC Settles Charges with Pequot Firm over Insider
Trading, WASH. POST (May 28, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/arti
cle/2010/05/27/AR2010052705351.html [https://perma.cc/335N-D2CB] (noting that “a
prominent hedge fund and its chief executive” agreed to settle with the SEC for $28 mil-
lion); Stephen Clark, Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go from
Here?, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 43, 48 (2010) (“wealthy insiders can afford to retain
distinguished attorneys”).
34. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1 (2017).
35. See generally In re Countrywide Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 588 F. Supp. 2d 1132 (C.D.
Cal. 2008).
2018] Insider Trading 793
of a corporation’s “senior executives sold shares worth almost $1.8 mil-
lion in the days after the company discovered a security breach that may
have compromised information on about 143 million U.S. consumers,”
and the corporation waited over a month before it disclosed that
breach.36 The Securities and Exchange Commission announced on Sep-
tember 7, 2017, that it charged a former Amazon financial analyst who
leaked confidential information to friends.
It is significant that among these traders are insiders in hedge funds
who typically serve very wealthy investors and organizations, and are
themselves quite wealthy by any standard.37 These facts do not deter in-
siders from gaining money the “insider trading way.” Therefore, further
solutions should be sought. One way is to examine the type of traders
who might usually violate the law. If they are sued, then their activities
are publicized.
There are wealthy persons who have paid insiders for their inside infor-
mation.38 There are insiders who traded information with other insid-
ers.39 There are groups of insiders who meet in various social and athletic
functions that can trade valuable information.40 Apart from the money,
there are desirable psychological benefits for insiders who crave recogni-
tion and a sense of belonging to the powerful elite.41
36. Anders Melin, Three Equifax Managers Sold Stock Before Cyber Hack Revealed,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sept. 7, 2017, 4:59 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2017-09-07/three-equifax-executives-sold-stock-before-revealing-cyber-hack [https://perma
.cc/LL7E-9MPQ].
37. See, e.g., Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Sec. &
Exch. Comm’n, Testimony Concerning Insider Trading (Sept. 26, 2006) (as amended Oct.
5, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2006/ts092606lct.htm [https://perma.cc/DA85-
NMER] (calling “insider trading by hedge funds . . . an area of significant concern” and
discussing recent enforcement actions).
38. See Finally, Punishment Fits the Crime, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 17, 2011), https://
www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2011/10/16/finally-punishment-fits-crime/BbuLPx
Iq5f8jPPTmdbOB5L/story.html (noting that inside trader “had a network of informants
whom he paid for inside information”); Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Hedge
Fund Founder Raj Rajaratnam Sentenced in Manhattan Federal Court to 11 Years in




39. See generally Kenneth R. Ahern, Information Networks: Evidence from Illegal In-
sider Trading Tips, 125 J. FIN. ECON. 26 (2017) (noting sharing of inside information
through networks of insiders).
40. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Billionaire Hedge
Fund Manager Raj Rajaratnam with Insider Trading (Oct. 16, 2009), https://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2009/2009-221.htm [https://perma.cc/9DGH-3VCH] (quoting SEC Director of
Enforcement calling insider trader “master of the rolodex” and stating that he “cultivated
a network of high-ranking corporate executives and insiders, and then tapped into this
ring”); see also Thomas Koenig & Robert Gogel, Interlocking Corporate Directorships as a
Social Network, 40 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 37, 40 (1981) (noting information, influence, and
power among corporate directors flows “through informal interaction at social clubs,
school reunions, business conferences, and innumerable other events”).
41. See, e.g., Emily A. Malone, Note, Insider Trading: Why to Commit the Crime from
a Legal and Psychological Perspective, 12 J.L. & POL’Y 327, 333–35 (2003) (suggesting that
in ImClone scandal (1) by selling stock before information was released traders would
avoid loss and “not endanger the social status they enjoyed as wealthy individuals”; (2)
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In sum, inside information can be an important source of power and
money for insiders, the position holders, the wealthy, and the actors close
to the management of other people’s money. Not surprisingly, many of
these insiders occupy fiduciary positions.
A. HOW DOES THE LAW DETER INSIDER TRADING?
Inside traders face “collateral consequences” on conviction.42 For ex-
ample, an inside trader “is often unable to return to his or her livelihood
after serving imprisonment.”43 Further, a Securities and Exchange Com-
mission enforcement action for insider trading is “damaging” to one’s ca-
reer. Thanks to the Internet and Google, “an SEC case would result in
the loss of job and become a permanent record on Google.” A criminal
conviction can be even more damaging. “The collateral damage from the
felony record is a preclusion from various lines of work, making rebuild-
ing much more tough.”44
B. HOWEVER, WHILE INSIDE TRADERS MAY NOT BE ABLE TO
CONTINUE THEIR CAREER IN THE SAME CAPACITY,
THEY MAY BE ABLE TO MAINTAIN A
POSITIVE LIFESTYLE
One hedge fund manager settled with the SEC and was barred from
managing other investors’ money. His hedge fund pleaded guilty in an
insider trading scandal and was shut down. However, the fund was con-
verted to a “family office” and the manager set up a hedge fund next
door. He maintained his lifestyle, including his $13 billion net worth, his
art collecting, his philanthropic activities, and was believed to be attempt-
ing to redeem himself to again be allowed to handle other investors’
money.45 Indeed, a number of white-collar criminals have returned from
prison to enter “polite society.” For example, some have written
memoirs, some have become television personalities, some have formed
their own firms or become involved with consulting or in public relations,
and one even founded a philanthropic foundation.46
broker “could have enjoyed potential career advancement associated with sharing inside
information with an important client”; and (3) CEO, “by tipping off friends and family,
would have strengthened his social relationships with them” (citing ELIZABETH SZOCKYJ,
THE LAW AND INSIDER TRADING: IN SEARCH OF A LEVEL PLAYING FIELD 5 (1993);
Charles Gasparino & Jerry Markon, Merrill Aide Will Plead Guilty, Cooperate on Martha
Stewart, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2002, at A1)).
42. See Hristova, supra note 25, at 303 (citing Ellen S. Podgor, The Challenge of White
Collar Sentencing, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 731, 739 (2007)).
43. Id. (quoting Podgor, supra note 42, at 739).
44. Roomy Khan, The SEC Needs to Play a Bigger Role in Insider Trading Cases, BUS.
INSIDER (Sept. 3, 2016, 9:06 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-sec-has-as-a-double-
standard-when-it-comes-to-insider-trading-2016-9 [https://perma.cc/734N-K4XA].
45. See Jen Wieczner, Inside Billionaire Steve Cohen’s Comeback, FORTUNE (Oct. 20,
2016), http://fortune.com/steve-cohen-billionaire-point72-hedge-fund/ [https://perma.cc/
N68R-YKJU].
46. See generally Daniel Bukszpan, Take Note, Bob McDonnell: 9 Financial Criminals
Who Made Good After Prison, FORTUNE (Jan. 9, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/01/09/take-
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C. HOW CAN THE LAW FURTHER DETER SUCH PEOPLE FROM
BENEFITING FROM THEIR POSITION?
In addition to monetary punishment, the law should explicitly author-
ize courts to disqualify or demote such traders from any position as insid-
ers—that is, any position that enabled them to gain, find out, or receive
inside information. For example, insider traders should be disqualified
from acting in the capacity of a director and officer of any public enter-
prise, in whatever form that takes. In addition, insider traders should be
disqualified from acting in any service that involves financial trading or
financial institutions, or any other service that involves contact with these
institutions and services. Such a prohibition is already imposed on fiduci-
aries and parties that are involved in the financial arena.47 In addition,
insider traders should be disqualified from acting in certain fiduciary po-
sitions for life, or disqualified for a specific period of time. Such disquali-
fications are neither unique nor new. Lawyers,48 physicians,49 brokers,50
and advisers51 have been subject by law to these types of disqualifications
for many years.
Thus, this prohibition should state that no one who was found to have
violated the prohibition on insider trading or on tipping inside informa-
tion should be permitted to serve as a director, officer, employee, major-
ity shareholder, servicer, or outside servicer of any kind, for any
institution, whether a corporation or any other legal organization. No
such person should hold any such position in a privately held or a publicly
held entity. The court, or the jury, or a regulator, might choose among
these positions and allow or disallow a defendant to act in such a capac-
ity. The court or jury should also establish the period of the prohibition.
Further, similar deterrents should be imposed on those who pay insiders
for inside information.
Some insider traders may be hungry for more money, disdain the regu-
lators, be proud of their smart circumvention of the law, and enjoy brag-
ging about their cunning ways around the law. One usual weakness of
such people is the pain of public shame.52 To be sure, there are people
note-bob-mcdonnell-9-financial-criminals-who-made-good-after-prison/ [https://perma.cc/
NC4N-AC8J].
47. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-9(b) (2012) (authorizing SEC to prohibit persons from serving
in certain capacities for investment company or certain affiliates); id. § 80b-3(f) (authoriz-
ing SEC to suspend or bar persons from association with investment adviser).
48. See, e.g., MASS. SUP. JUD. CT. R. 4:01 § 4 (2013) (authorizing suspension or disbar-
ment of lawyers).
49. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112, § 5 (2013) (authorizing board of registration in
medicine to “revoke, suspend, or cancel” certificate of physician registration).
50. See FINRA R. 8310(a)(3)-(4) (2008) (stating that FINRA may suspend member-
ship of member, expel member, or cancel membership of member).
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(e) (2012) (authorizing SEC to suspend or revoke investment
adviser registration).
52. See Hristova, supra note 25, at 306 (suggesting that shaming may be particularly
appropriate for insider traders as “reputation and the loss of reputation are of particular
importance to inside traders, who are unlikely to take challenges to their public images
lightly”); Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L.
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who do not care how they are described publicly. But, there are many
who do. Being publicly shamed conflicts with insider traders fundamental
drive to be admired and envied. Therefore, a threat of shame may be
more deterring to such people, as they may not be bothered by a court
judgment that they have done wrong or by chastisement in the press.
However, disqualification and shame may be an effective deterrent.
Commentators have suggested that some business leaders are narcis-
sists and that narcissists have characteristics that would make them suited
to being business leaders.53 In addition, a sample of British senior busi-
ness managers had “statistically equivalent mean scale scores” of narcis-
sism compared with mental illness and psychopathic disorder patient
samples.54
The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Man-
ual of Mental Disorders sets out the diagnostic criteria for “narcissistic
personality disorder”:
A pervasive pattern of grandiosity (in fantasy or behavior), need for
admiration, and lack of empathy, beginning by early adulthood and
present in a variety of contexts, as indicated by five (or more) of the
following:
(1) Has a grandiose sense of self-importance (e.g., exaggerates
achievements and talents, expects to be recognized as superior
without commensurate achievements).
(2) Is preoccupied with fantasies of unlimited success, power, bril-
liance, beauty, or ideal love.
(3) Believes that he or she is “special” and unique and can only be
understood by, or should associate with, other special or high-sta-
tus people (or institutions).
(4) Requires excessive admiration.
(5) Has a sense of entitlement (i.e., unreasonable expectations of
especially favorable treatment or automatic compliance with his or
her expectations).
(6) Is interpersonally exploitative (i.e., takes advantage of others
to achieve his or her own ends).
(7) Lacks empathy: is unwilling to recognize or identify with the
feelings and needs of others.
(8) Is often envious of others or believes that others are envious of
him or her.
REV. 959, 967 (1999) (suggesting that “especially for top-level managers and members of
their social class, fear of being shamed before their family members and peers may even
exceed the fear of criminal prosecution, exposure to civil lawsuits, or other forms of offi-
cially imposed sanctions”).
53. See, e.g., Michael Maccoby, Narcissistic Leaders: The Incredible Pros, the Inevitable
Cons, 78 HARV. BUS. REV. 68 (2000); Belinda Jane Board & Katarina Fritzon, Disordered
Personalities at Work, 11 PSYCHOL. CRIME & L. 17, 19 (2005); Renee M. Jones, The Irra-
tional Actor in the CEO Suite: Implications for Corporate Governance, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L.
713, 741 (2017); W. Keith Campbell et al., Narcissism in Organizational Contexts, 21 HUM.
RESOURCE MGMT. REV. 268, 272 (2011) (noting that CEOs Jack Welch, Michael Eisner,
Larry Ellison, and Bob Nardelli have been identified as “narcissistic”).
54. See Board & Fritzon, supra note 53, at 23–25.
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(9) Shows arrogant, haughty behaviors or attitudes.55
Parts of criterion (2) above (i.e., preoccupation with success and power)
suggest that some business leaders might be deterred by the possibility of
loss of their position or a prohibition on, or disqualification regarding,
their activity. More business leaders may be deterred by shame. Shame
may be defined according to the measures of behavior (not the terms of
the legal and fair measures), and may be a punishment that some persons,
especially in prominent positions, might fear almost as much as prison.56
Conversely, absence of any publicity may be as painful a punishment for
criminal activity. Erasing a well-known person’s public notoriety can be
tremendously painful to a person who basks in it.
Publicity, or perhaps absence of admiring publicity, can constitute a
severe punishment for some people. However, this type of punishment
may open the door to the regulators’ unconstitutional activities. To be
sure, we do not have such punishments in our criminal code or securities
regulation. But, the press may be offered an opportunity to serve society
by showing that insider traders are engaging in criminal offenses. This
notoriety might deter.
These findings need not be generalized, but they may support disquali-
fication of insider traders. After all, when leadership changes its behavior,
the culture of most, if not the entire group of followers, is likely to change
as well. The punishment suggested here may lead not only to pain for
some wrongdoers, but also to a culture of principles, which power-holders
are more likely to follow and lead their followers to.
55. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 669 (5th ed. 2013).
56. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner, Shaming White-Collar Criminals: A Proposal
for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365, 370–71 (1999) (argu-
ing that shaming, unlike fines, causes reputational damage and, like imprisonment, “elimi-
nates the possibility of generating new assets through cooperative ventures”). Similarly,
shaming may be more effective than fines. See id. at 381 (arguing that fines “are open to
the interpretation that society is attaching a price tag to, rather than prohibiting, the pun-
ished behavior: we cannot condemn someone morally for buying what we are willing to
sell, even if we are charging a high price for it”).
